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Reconsidering Incarceration:
New Directions for Reducing Crime
January 2007

By Don

Stemen

Director of Research, Center on Sentencing and Corrections

From the director
After falling for more than a decade, in many parts
of the United States crime rates appear to be inching up again. Although it is still too early to call this
a trend, it is not hard to imagine this shift in direction
leading to calls for tougher sentences and more incarceration—even though our prisons are already full and
corrections in many states already absorbs so much of
the available resources.
The last time we embarked down this path, there
was little empirical evidence showing that jails and
prisons represented the best way to reduce crime.
Today, in contrast, researchers have so much data to
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indicate a cause and effect relationship, they do suggest that policymakers with limited resources should
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might be realized from investing in other areas.

In the 1970s the United States embarked on one of the largest policy
experiments of the 20th century—the expanded use of incarceration to
achieve greater public safety. Between 1970 and 2005, state and federal
authorities increased prison populations by 628 percent.1 By 2005,
more than 1.5 million persons were incarcerated in U.S. prisons on any
given day, and an additional 750,000 were incarcerated in local jails.2
By the turn of the 21st century, more than 5.6 million living Americans
had spent time in a state or federal prison—nearly 3 percent of the U.S.
population.3 Having so many people imprisoned over the course of 30
years raises an obvious question: Has this experiment worked?
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The most sophisticated studies available generally agree that increased
incarceration rates have some impact on reducing crime rates, but the scope of
that impact is limited.4 For example, while the U.S. experienced a dramatic drop in
crime between 1992 and 1997, imprisonment was responsible for just 25 percent
of that reduction.5 Seventy-five percent of the crime drop through the 1990s was
attributable to factors other than incarceration.6 As a result, many commentators
argue that the pivotal question for policymakers is not “Does incarceration increase
public safety?” but rather, “Is incarceration the most effective way to increase
public safety?”
The emerging answer to the rephrased query is “no.” Analysts are nearly unanimous
in their conclusion that continued growth in incarceration will prevent considerably
fewer, if any, crimes—and at substantially greater cost to taxpayers.7 In the future,
policing strategies, unemployment, wages, education, and other factors associated
with low crime rates may account for more significant reductions. Yet, policy and
spending for public safety continue to focus heavily on imprisonment, effectively
limiting investment in these promising alternatives.
This paper seeks to help officials understand the complexities and limitations
of current research on incarceration and crime in the United States. It also
examines research on several of the other factors that might be developed as
part of an expanded notion of public safety.8 Informed by this more inclusive
understanding of current research, it suggests that effective public safety strategies
should move away from an exclusive focus on incarceration to embrace other
factors associated with low crime rates in a more comprehensive policy framework
for safeguarding citizens.

Estimating the Impact of Incarceration
on Crime

Research has consistently shown crime rates to be affected by many factors,

including economics, social and demographic characteristics, culture, politics,
and incarceration rates. To date, policymakers’ emphasis on incarceration for
reducing crime has been premised, largely, on theories about its influence in
incapacitating active offenders and deterring would-be offenders. However,
thanks to rapid increases in crime and imprisonment through the 1970s and
1980s, followed by a sharp decrease in crime in the 1990s, we now have a
large body of recent empirical work on the effects of incarceration to draw on
as well.9
Much of this research seeks to quantify the association between the size of
a jurisdiction’s incarceration rate and its crime rate.10 Led primarily by economists, these analyses have become increasingly sophisticated, examining
many factors and looking at data across jurisdictions and over long periods
of time.11 Much of this research has confirmed a relationship between higher
incarceration rates and lower crime rates. However, as Table 1 summarizes,
recent studies vary widely in their conclusions about how strong this relationship is and, in some cases, whether it really exists after all.12
For example, using national-level data, researchers have found that a 10 percent higher incarceration rate is associated with anywhere from a 9 percent to a
22 percent lower crime rate.13 In contrast, analyses using state-level data found
a weaker association, concluding that a 10 percent increase in incarceration is
associated with a crime rate that is anywhere from 0.11 percent to 4 percent
lower.14 Similar estimates have been generated from studies using county-level
data, ranging from a 2 percent to a 4 percent crime-rate difference.15 Moreover,
several studies have found no relationship between incarceration rates and
crime rates.16 One study even found that higher incarceration rates were associated with higher crime rates in states with already high incarceration rates
(incarceration rates above 325 inmates per 100,000 population).17
As these disparate findings suggest, the impact of incarceration on crime
is inconsistent from one study to the next. One could use available research to
argue that a 10 percent increase in incarceration is associated with no difference in crime rates, a 22 percent lower index crime rate, or a decrease only in
the rate of property crime.18 Therefore, to be guided by the available empirical
research, policymakers clearly need to develop a more nuanced understanding
of the literature.
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Table 1. Summary of Studies Estimating the Impact of Incarceration Rates on Crime Rates

Studies that do not account for simultaneity
Study

Data

Estimated percentage change in crime rates  
due to a 10% increase in incarceration rates

Devine,
		
Sheley, and Smith (1988)19
National — 1948–1985
		

–28.4 (violent offenses)
–19.9 (property offenses)
–22.0 (index offenses)

		
Marvell and Moody (1997, 1998)20
National — 1958–1995
		

–7.9 (violent offenses)
–9.5 (property offenses)
–9.3 (index offenses)

Marvell and Moody (1994)21

–1.6 (index offenses)

49 states — 1971–1989

Besci
		
(1999)22
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993
		

–0.46 (violent offenses)
–0.91 (property offenses)
–0.87 (index offenses)

Rapheal and Winter-Ebmer (2001)23
50 states — 1971–1997
		

not significant (violent offenses)
–1.1 (property offenses)

Donahue and Levitt (2001)24
50 states — 1973–1997
		

not significant (violent offenses)
–1.6 (property offenses)

Levitt (2001)25
50 states — 1950–1999
		

–0.76 (property offenses)
–1.3 (violent offenses)

		
DeFina and Arvanites (2002)26
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1998
		
		

not signifiant (murder, rape, assault, robbery)
–1.1 (burglary)
–0.56 (larceny)
–1.4 (auto theft)

Kovandzic and Sloan (2002)27

not significant (index offenses)

57 Florida counties — 1980–1998

Washington State Institute 		
39 Washington counties — 1980–2001
for Public Policy (2003)28

–2.4 (index offenses)

		
Liedka, Piehl, and Useem (2006)29
50 states and D.C. — 1970–2000
		
		

–0.118 (index offenses) 				
(states with incarceration rates <325)		
+0.05 (index offenses)
(states with incarceration rates >325)

Kovandzic and Vieraitis (2006)30

not significant (index offenses)

58 Florida counties — 1980–2000

Studies that do account for simultaneity
Study

Data

Estimated percentage change in crime rates  
due to a 10% increase in incarceration rates

Levitt (1996)31
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993
		

–3.8 (violent offenses)
–2.6 (property offenses)

Spelman (2000)32

–4.0 (index offenses)

50 states and D.C. — 1971–1997

Spelman (2005)33
254 Texas counties — 1990–2000
		

–4.4 (violent offenses)
–3.6 (property offenses)

Evaluating the Findings: The Limits of Research. All stud-

ies are not equal in design and value, of course. Different findings often arise
because of crucially important methodological choices that researchers make
and which the literature has only recently begun to address and settle. These
include:

•

the choice of whether to study the relationship between incarceration
and crime at the county, state, or national level (i.e., the level of aggregation used);34

•

whether a study accounts for the fact that incarceration and crime
occupy a two-way street in which each influences the other (i.e., whether
an analysis controls for simultaneity); and

•

the number of other factors affecting crime that a study takes into
account (i.e., the specification of other factors potentially associated with
crime rates).

Such technical decisions can produce tremendous differences in results, leading researchers and policymakers to strikingly different conclusions.
On which findings should policymakers rely, then? “[I]f...results are to
converge on a defensible estimate,” argues William Spelman, perhaps the
leading researcher in this area, “[t]hey must measure effects at the lowest level
of aggregation possible,” “account for simultaneity,” and control for as many
other factors as possible.35 Accordingly, the most reliable studies are those con-

Supporters take the findings
as a confirmation that
prison works, concluding
that every 10 percent
increase in incarceration
rates will produce a 2 to 4
percent decrease in crime
rates. Opponents, on the

ducted at the state or county level that account for simultaneity and consider

other hand, see the findings

a significant number of crime-related factors. To date, only three studies—two

as a confirmation that

by Spelman and one by Steven D. Levitt—include all three of these criteria.36
Interestingly, all three have produced a fairly consistent finding, associating a

prison does not work very

10 percent higher incarceration rate with a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate.37

well at all.

Levitt’s and Spelman’s findings have garnered a great deal of attention from
both supporters and opponents of a continued emphasis on incarceration.
Supporters take the findings as a confirmation that prison works, concluding
that every 10 percent increase in incarceration rates will produce a 2 to 4 percent decrease in crime rates. Opponents, on the other hand, see the findings
as a confirmation that prison does not work very well at all. They maintain that
even a 4 percent decrease in crime is not much for a 10 percent increase in
incarceration.38 Indeed, Spelman himself characterizes a 2 to 4 percent crime
reduction as a fairly limited impact given the sizable financial obligation states
have incurred in incarcerating so many people.
An even more complex picture emerges from analyses focusing on the
neighborhood level.39 A growing body of research examining specific neighborhoods finds that more incarceration can actually lead to increasing crime rates.40
Several recent studies maintain that communities may reach an incarceration
“tipping point.” Dina Rose and Todd Clear, for example, found that the level of
crime in several Florida communities increased after the incarceration rate of
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individuals from those communities reached a certain level.41 Rose and Clear
argue that high rates of imprisonment break down the social and family bonds
that guide individuals away from crime, remove adults who would otherwise
nurture children, deprive communities of income, reduce future income potential, and engender a deep resentment toward the legal system. As a result, as
communities become less capable of maintaining social order through families or social groups, crime rates go up.42

Applying the Research Findings: Perils for Policy. Setting

aside the possibility of such tipping points, even if a limited relationship
between crime and incarceration were established, a precise ratio could not be
applied to policymaking in every location. This is because empirical research
on incarceration and crime is not meant to be a prescription for future imprisonment policies at the local level, even though this is how some seek to use
it. Research only provides an estimate of average relationships between incarceration and crime rates across jurisdictions. Thus, such findings are a blunt
instrument whose applicability to any specific jurisdiction is dubious.
Research, therefore, cannot predict the impact of future prison increases
in a given state. What happens in any particular jurisdiction will depend on a
variety of factors that have yet to be contemplated by crime and incarceration
research. Some of these are environmental, such as social preferences, economic changes, and political activity. Others are practical: the size of a state’s
current prison population, the way offenders are sanctioned or incarcerated,
and the types of offenders a state chooses to incarcerate. In the debate about
the impact of incarceration on crime, such issues are generally overlooked by
both sides and largely absent in the academic literature they draw upon. This
is surprising given the practical influence these considerations can exert on
the bigger issue of how crime and incarceration interact. The following brief
discussion of each of these factors may help illustrate the limitations.

The Size of State Prison Populations
The size of a state’s prison population and crime rate will influence the impact
of increases in incarceration rates. To date, most arguments for more incarceration to further reduce crime have relied on Spelman’s estimate that a 10
percent increase correlates with a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate. Even if that
estimate is accurate, however, for a state with an already high incarceration rate
the costs of increasing incarceration by 10 percent to achieve a 2 to 4 percent
reduction in crime could be tremendous. For example, California and Nebraska
had very similar crime rates in 2003 of approximately 4,000 index offenses

per 100,000 people in the population. To achieve a 2 to 4 percent reduction,
California, with a prison population of 162,678 inmates, would have to incarcerate an additional 16,089 inmates.43 To achieve the same rate of reduction,
Nebraska, with a prison population of 3,976, would have to incarcerate just 400
additional inmates. If the average cost to incarcerate an offender for one year is
$22,650, California would spend $355 million more than Nebraska to achieve
the same level of public safety.44 The cost incurred per unit of crime reduction,
then, is substantially larger for California. Thus, an increase in incarceration
in a state with an already large prison population may require a huge boost in
actual prison populations that may be difficult to sustain economically.
Raymond Liedka, Anne Piehl, and Bert Useem have confirmed, moreover,
that increases in prison populations in states with already large prison populations have less impact on crime than increases in states with smaller prison
populations.45 States experience “accelerating declining marginal returns, that
is, a percent reduction in crime that gets ever smaller with ever larger prison
populations,” they argue.46 Thus, increases in incarceration rates are associated
with lower crime rates at low levels of imprisonment, but the size of that association shrinks as incarceration rates get bigger. Eventually, they say, there is
an “inflection point” where increases in incarceration rates are associated with
higher crime rates. This inflection point occurs when a state’s incarceration
rate reaches some point between 325 and 492 inmates per 100,000 people. In
other words, states with incarceration rates above this range can expect to experience higher crime rates with future increases in incarceration rates. (This
state-level phenomenon recalls the neighborhood effects of high incarceration
rates cited by Rose and Clear.)

The Content of Punishment
Incarceration is not the only punishment that may reduce crime rates. Other
types of punishment, including fines, probation, community service, drug
treatment, or other sanctions have also been shown to suppress crime. These
alternative sanctions are not considered in the crime control studies noted
above, however. Had they increased at the same time as the expansion of imprisonment, these sanctions may have contributed—in part or even completely—to
the effects found in those studies. Similarly, the content of incarceration—the
quality of inmates’ experience in prison—may matter greatly as well. Studies
so far have only considered how the size of prison populations affects crime
rates. Although some research has examined how related factors like the
length of stay in prison or changes in supervision policies after release influence recidivism, no studies apparently have considered how or whether such
factors affect crime rates.

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 
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The research on crime rates has not examined the impact of prison-based
programming, either. States vary a great deal in the amount and content of programs offered to inmates. A large body of literature has found that the design
and content of specific programs can reduce individual recidivism rates.47 For
example, drug treatments using therapeutic community models or rehabilitative programs tailored to the risks and needs of offenders have been shown to
reduce recidivism, while boot camps and unstructured rehabilitation programs
have been found to have no positive influence on recidivism.48 Given this demonstrated impact on recidivism, it stands to reason that programming during
incarceration could also affect incarceration’s influence on crime rates.

The Types of Offenders in Prison
The type of offenders a state decides to incarcerate may also be a relevant factor.
Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins argue that continued expansion of the
prison system does little more than increase the number of individuals in the
criminal justice net without reducing criminal offending or crime rates.49 U.S.
prisons already housed the most serious violent offenders in the early 1980s,
they argue; prison expansion since then has resulted in nothing more than the
imprisonment of large numbers of nonviolent, “marginal” offenders. Thus,
since the worst offenders had already been incarcerated, Zimring and Hawkins
contend that increasing incarceration rates through the 1990s did nothing to
impact the crime rate.
Others have noted as well that the increased incarceration of drug offenders has helped reduce the effectiveness of incarceration.50 Between 1980 and
2005, the number of inmates incarcerated for drug possession in state prisons or local jails grew by more than 1,000 percent.51 By 2004, 419,000 drug
possessors were incarcerated in state prisons or local jails at a cost of nearly
$8.3 billion annually.52 Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven D. Levitt argue that the
continued increase in the number of drug offenders in prisons may lead to a
“crowding out” effect, in which the high number of incarcerated drug offenders
prevents the incarceration of offenders prone to more serious crime, thereby
reducing the effectiveness of incarceration to reduce crime. 52a
Analysts agree with apparent unanimity that future increases in incarceration rates for such offenders will do less and cost more.53 Washington State,
for example, concluded that while more incarceration has led to less crime
in the state, the benefits of additional prison expansion will be smaller and
more expensive to achieve.54 Specifically, an increase in the incarceration rate
in 2003 prevented considerably fewer crimes than did previous similar-size
increases. The state further concluded that while incarcerating violent and
high-volume property offenders continued to generate more benefits than

costs, in the future each additional person incarcerated will result in fewer prevented crimes. Washington even found that increasing the incarceration rate
for drug offenders in the 1990s actually had a negative impact overall, as it
now costs more to incarcerate additional drug offenders than the average value
of the crimes prevented by their imprisonment. Money should not be the sole
measure by which policymakers evaluate the effectiveness or attractiveness of
a policy, of course. However, financial implications are a relevant concern of
officials facing limited public resources and a seemingly endless list of areas in
need of investment.

Estimating the Impact of Other
Factors on Crime
Between 1990 and 2005, the crime rate in the United States fell dramatically to
its lowest point in 30 years.55 However, as noted earlier, according to Spelman
only 25 percent of this crime drop through the 1990s could be explained by
increasing incarceration rates.56 The remaining 75 percent, therefore, must be
due to factors other than incarceration. Indeed, researchers have identified a
number of such factors including, for example, fewer young persons in the
population, smaller urban populations, decreases in crack cocaine markets,
lower unemployment rates, higher wages, more education and high school
graduates, more police per capita, and more arrests for public order offenses.57
An examination of just a few of these indicates that future investment in other
policy areas may be not only more effective but also more cost effective than
continued investment in increased prison populations (see Table 2).
CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 

10 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

Policing. Several authors have found an association between increases in

the number of police per capita and lower crime rates. For example, using citylevel data, Levitt found that a 10 percent increase in the size of a city’s police
force was associated with an 11 percent lower violent crime rate and a 3 percent lower property crime rate.58 Thomas Marvel and Carlisle Moody similarly
found a 10 percent increase in the size of a city’s police force associated with
a 3 percent reduction in index crime rates.59 Using county-level data, Tomislav
Kovandzic and John J. Sloan also found associations between the size of police

Future investment

forces and crime, concluding that a 10 percent increase in the number of

in other policy areas may

level, however, Marvel and Moody found no association between the size of the

police was associated with a 1.4 percent lower index crime rate.60 At the state-

be not only more effective

police force and crime rates. This disparate finding suggests that the impact of

but also more cost effective

Using Marvel and Moody’s estimate tying a 10 percent increase in the size

than continued investment

of a city’s police force to a 3 percent decrease in the index crime rate, we can

in increased prison

say, New York City, where the 2004 index crime rate was 2,800 offenses per

populations.

increased police presence may be felt only at the local level.61

imagine how a crime reduction policy focusing on policing might operate in,
100,000 people in the population. To achieve a 3 percent reduction in the crime
rate by increasing incarceration, New York City—with a prison population of
33,564 inmates—would have to incarcerate an additional 3,300 inmates at a
cost of approximately $121.5 million per year.62, 63 With a police force of 39,110
sworn police officers, the city could achieve the same reduction in crime by
hiring 3,911 more police officers at a cost of $97.2 million per year.64, 65 Compared to policing, then, incarceration would cost the city $24.3 million more to
achieve the same level of public safety.66
It is important to note that in the same way the content of incarceration
policy may affect how imprisonment relates to crime, so too may the content
of policing policy influence how crime develops. Poorly structured policing
policies could negate the positive potential of an increase in officers. Also, an
increase in the number of police would not necessarily translate directly into
more law enforcement and arrests. Provided such concerns are taken into
account, however, this example illustrates the promise of increasing policing
as an alternative to increasing incarceration.67

Unemployment and Wages. Incarceration, employment, and income

interact on several levels in the United States. Incarceration creates problems
of low earnings and irregular employment for individuals after release from
prison by dissuading employers from hiring them, disqualifying them from
certain professions, eroding job skills, limiting acquisition of work experience, creating behaviors inconsistent with work routines outside prison, and
undermining social connections to good job opportunities.68 Research has

Table 2. Summary of Studies Estimating the Impact of Other Social Factors on Crime Rates

Police per Capita
Study

Data

Estimated percentage change in crime rates
due to a 10% increase in indicator

Marvell and Moody (1996)

56 U.S. cities — 1971–1992

–3 (index offenses)

Marvell and Moody (1996)

49 states — 1971–1992

not significant (index offenses)

Levitt (1997)
59 U.S. cities — 1970–1992
		

–11 (violent offenses)
–3 (property offenses)

Kovandzic and Sloan (2002)

57 Florida counties — 1980–1998

–1.4 (index offenses)

Data

Estimated percentage change in crime rates
due to a 10% increase in indicator

Unemployment Rate
Study

Levitt (1996)83
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993
		

not significant (violent offenses)
10 (property offenses)

Levitt (1997)
59 U.S. cities — 1970–1992
		

not significant (violent offenses)
10.4 (property offenses)

Rapheal and Winter-Ebmer (2001)
50 states — 1971–1997
		

not significant (violent offenses)
16.3 (property offenses)

Gould et al. (2002)
705 counties — 1979–1997
		

not significant (violent offenses)
16.6 (property offenses)

Real Wages
Study

Data

Estimated percentage change in crime rates
due to a 10% increase in indicator

Gould
et al. (2002)
705 counties — 1979–1997
		
		

–25.3 (violent offenses)
–12.6 (property offenses)
–13.5 (index offenses)

Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001)
50 states — 1971–1997
		

–1.6 (violent offenses)
not significant (property offenses)

Grogger (1998)

–10 (index offenses)

Individual survey data (1980)

High School Graduation Rate
Study

Data

Estimated percentage change in crime rates
due to a 10% increase in indicator

Lochner and Moretti (2004)

50 states — 1960, 1970, 1980

–9.4 (index offenses)
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shown that men with criminal records experience no growth in earnings and,
therefore, have few choices other than day labor.69 At the community level,
neighborhoods with high incarceration rates may be shunned by employers.
Further, as John Hagan argues, incarceration can generate social connections
to illegal rather than legal employment, thus, potentially increasing crime.70
Indeed, researchers have found that economic shifts have significantly
affected crime rates in the last decade. Using state-level data, Steven Raphael
and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer found that a 10 percent decrease in a state’s unemployment rate corresponded with a 16 percent reduction in property crime rates;
the researchers concluded that, between 1992 and 1997, “slightly more than
40 percent of the decline [in the overall property crime rate] can be attributed
to the decline in unemployment.”71 Liedka, Piehl, and Useem produced similar findings, also using state-level data.72 Analyses using county-level data have
produced estimates that find a similar association between unemployment and
crime; Eric Gould, Bruce Weinberg, and David Mustard, for example, found
that a 10 percent reduction in unemployment rates was associated with a 16.6
percent reduction in property crime.73 Both studies found no association, however, between unemployment and violent crime.74 Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
conclude that “the magnitudes of the crime-unemployment effects...suggest
that policies aimed at improving the employment prospects of workers facing
the greatest obstacles can be effective tools for combating crime.”75
Research has also considered the relationship between real wages and
crime. Using national-level data, Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard determined
that a 10 percent increase in real wages saw a 13 percent lower index crime
rate—specifically, a 12 percent lower property crime rate and a 25 percent lower
violent crime rate.76 At the state level, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer found that a
10 percent increase in per capita income saw a 1.6 percent lower violent crime
rate; Liedka, Piehl, and Useem found similar associations at the state level.77
Using individual-level data, Jeffrey Grogger found that a 10 percent increase in
real wages was associated with a 10 percent decrease in crime participation at
the individual level.78 In examining the crime drop of the 1990s, Grogger and
Michael Willis suggested that a better economy allowed more young people
opportunities in the labor market rather than in crime. They attributed the
crime drop largely to the expanding economy.79

Education. The link between crime and education has also begun to

attract research attention. Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, for example,
have shown an increase in citizens’ education levels to be associated with lower
crime rates: specifically, a one-year increase in the average education of citizens results in a 1.7 percent lower index crime rate. In addition, they associated
a 10 percent increase in graduation rates with a 9.4 percent lower index crime

rate. Combined with Gould and his colleagues’ findings on the link between
wages and crime, Lochner and Moretti argue that “a 10 percent increase in
high school graduation rates should reduce arrest rates by 5 to 10 percent
through increased wages alone.”80 “[A] 1 percent increase in male high school
graduation rates would save as much as $1.4 billion” nationally through crime
reduction, they conclude.81
Moreover, prison-based education programs have been found to significantly reduce recidivism rates for offenders after release.82 In their recent
examination of the effects of prison education participation across three states,
researchers Stephen Steurer, Linda Smith, and Alice Tracy did not consider the
impact of such education programs on overall crime rates, but their findings of
significantly reduced recidivism for individuals who participated in such programs underscore the impact of education on reentry success.

Beyond Incarceration
Given the demonstrated influence of these other factors on crime and the
decreasing impact of incarceration, criminal justice policymakers appear to have
placed undue emphasis on incarceration. As William Spelman has cautioned, “It
is no longer sufficient, if it ever was, to demonstrate that prisons are better than
nothing. Instead, they must be better than the next-best use of the money.”84
Yet, in the past two decades, spending on these other factors has been cut.
Corrections expenditures were the only state budget category other than Medicaid to increase as a percentage of total state spending over the past 20 years.85
Between 1985 and 2004, states increased corrections spending by 202 percent. By comparison, spending on higher education grew by just 3 percent,
Medicaid by 47 percent, and secondary and elementary education by 55 percent; spending on public assistance decreased by more than 60 percent during
the same period (see Figure 1).86 Public opinion appears to be in harmony with
a move away from incarceration spending. Whereas 75 percent of Americans
believed that too little money was spent on halting rising crime rates in 1994,
by 2002, this had declined to 56 percent. In contrast, during the same period
the proportion of Americans responding that too little money was spent on
welfare increased from 13 percent to 21 percent.87
Such approaches are not new to criminal justice policy discussions. Many
commentators have argued for a crime reduction policy that focuses on the
labor market by addressing employment, wages, and education.89 In the lim-
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ited areas where such policies have been implemented, they have targeted
individuals believed to be at high risk of crime involvement, such as high
school dropouts, inner-city youth, offenders, and ex-offenders. But a broader
approach would require a shift in criminal justice policy away from reactive
responses to criminal offending and toward a proactive attempt to address the
underlying causes of criminal offending. It also requires a more general shift
in policymaking attitudes toward the view that public safety may best be served
by protecting citizens from the factors that can contribute to crime.

Figure 1. Percentage Change in State Spending, 1985-2004
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Moreover, the public favors a policy that addresses the underlying causes of
crime rather than simply responds to crime after it occurs. Polling by Peter D.
Hart Research Associates, for example, shows the public questioning whether
incarceration is the best crime control policy. In 1994, 42 percent of Americans favored responding to crime with stricter sentencing; by 2001, this had
decreased to just 32 percent. Conversely, in 1994, only 48 percent of Americans said they favored addressing the underlying causes of crime; by 2001, this
had increased to 65 percent (see Figure 2).88

n = TOUGHER RESPONSES TO CRIME
n = ADDRESS THE CAUSES OF CRIME

Figure 2. Public Support for Approaches to Crime, 1994 and 2001
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Toward a New Approach to Public Safety
After 15 years of declining crime rates, many analysts are claiming that “prison
works.” But, as Elliot Currie notes, “if ‘prison works’ is the answer, what was
the question?”90 If the question is whether it is possible to prevent individuals from committing crimes by putting them in prison, then prison certainly
works; it works to punish and incapacitate those who have committed crimes.
But if the question is what is the best way to reduce crime, “prison works”
may not be the most helpful response. Does a five-year prison sentence “work”
better to reduce crime than a two-year prison sentence? Does a two-year prison
sentence for nonviolent offenders “work” as well as a two-year prison sentence
for violent offenders?
The most salient question of all may be, Do the resources devoted to prison
“work” better to ensure public safety than if those resources were devoted to
something else?91 Prisons are not the only way to fight crime. Policymakers
could spend money on more judges, better staffed or equipped law enforcement, or better-trained probation and parole officers. They could invest, as this
paper indicates, in other, non-criminal-justice areas shown to affect crime: education, employment, economic development, etc. The impact of incarceration
on crime is limited and diminishing. The public’s support for reactive crime
control is also in decline. It is therefore fitting that we reconsider the continued
emphasis on and dedication of resources to incarceration.
Public safety cannot be achieved only by responding to crime after it
occurs; research shows that it may also depend on protecting people against
those factors that have been shown to be associated with high crime rates,
such as unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy. By pursuing crime reduction
chiefly through incarceration, states are forgoing the opportunity to invest in
these other important areas. As state policymakers continue to feel pressure
to introduce measures to keep crime rates low, they would therefore do well to
look beyond incarceration for alternative policies that not only may be able to
accomplish the important task of protecting public safety, but may do so more
efficiently and more effectively.
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